MALI (Cont'd)

UPDATE: The former President of Mali, ATT, officially resigned today following a deal negotiated by ECOWAS. ATT hasn't been a factor in the developments since the coup, but as the technical and still internationally recognized president of Mali it was necessary for him to officially resign. Sanogo's military junta has agreed to step down and allow a transitional body to take power. The transitional body will pave the way for elections at some point in the future. According to news reports, ECOWAS is also readying its (now 3,000 strong) force to enter Mali and retake territory lost by the Malian army.

The first development is very good and the second is potentially very bad. The transition from Sanogo to a civilian administration led by Dioncounda Traore (the Speaker of Parliament) is good. Potential downsides include the facts that a)Traore is a divisive figure in Malian politics and may struggle to unite and lead the country even for a short time, b)the military may not support the transition as Sanogo does not seem to have widespread control, and c) the public supported the coup to a large degree and their reaction to civilian authority may be mixed. All in all though the transition to civilian rule is a very good thing for Mali at this point because it paves the way for international recognition of the Malian government, aid (at least humanitarian) for areas controlled by the Malian government, the reestablishment of democracy, and (most important) the lifting of sanctions imposed by ECOWAS.

The prospect of ECOWAS troops advancing into Northern Mali is not good news from my perspective for a number of reasons.

First, the rebels have said they will not advance any further south so a force intended to prevent this is unnecessary.

Second, the rebels are more divided than they appear. In my last post I mentioned the MNLA (Tuareg resistance fighters), Ansar Din (AD) (islamist fighters intent on establishing Sharia law-pictured entering the city of Timbuktu), and AQLIM (the Al Qaeda offshoot in the Sahara). Reports have indicated that there are also Arab Militia, and Militia groups forming from the tribes along the river. Two of these local groups, the Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo militias (literally 'land owners' and 'land offspring', respectively) will further destabilize the area as they are opposed to MNLA, AQLIM and AD. In the Songhai language and in this context, both names imply a low-level resistance movement against the invaders. The Malian army reportedly distributed weapons to some of these groups before it was overrun. Tuareg society is divided along clan and factional lines so the MNLA cannot be considered one cohesive force. Due to the sudden power vacuum there are also bandit groups forming to take advantage of the lack of law enforcement. The MNLA have declared Azawad to be independent and above all they now want international recognition. To gain recognition, they must prove that they are a legitimate authority and must therefore eliminate AQLIM and AD. There will very likely soon be a large amount of fighting in northern Mali: between MNLA and AQLIM/AD, most likely within the MNLA itself, and between local militias and everyone else. As far as manpower, experts consider the MNLA to be far stronger than either AD or AQLIM, but probably less organized and not as well armed. No one knows anything much about the strength of the local militias.

Given these divisions and the near certainty of further violence in Northern Mali, it would be counter intuitive for ECOWAS to send 3,000 men into the area. Why not let the rebels fight amongst themselves? The MNLA, although dangerous and universally opposed in the establishment of a new state, are not enemy #1. AQLIM and AD should be viewed as the primary enemies. Pushing soldiers north could have the very negative effects of a) uniting the rebel factions, and b) provoking Tuareg in Niger, Algeria, and Libya to join the rebellion. Particularly in Niger there is potential for a second rebellion, although the government there has handled the situation well so far.

What ECOWAS, and the international community, could do at this point is to reach out to the MNLA, as soon as it has clear leadership, in order to remove AQLIM/AD. Elimination of these two groups should be a precondition for dialogue with the MNLA. If dialogue is promised, it could provide an incentive for the MNLA to unify and eliminate AQLIM/AD without outside intervention. The situation should be monitored closely, but an invasion should not be undertaken. Bonus: Northern Mali is mostly desert and is the size of France. 3,000 men will be hard pressed to take it from veteran Tuareg warriors.