MALI (Cont'd)

UPDATE: The former President of Mali, ATT, officially resigned today following a deal negotiated by ECOWAS. ATT hasn't been a factor in the developments since the coup, but as the technical and still internationally recognized president of Mali it was necessary for him to officially resign. Sanogo's military junta has agreed to step down and allow a transitional body to take power. The transitional body will pave the way for elections at some point in the future. According to news reports, ECOWAS is also readying its (now 3,000 strong) force to enter Mali and retake territory lost by the Malian army.

The first development is very good and the second is potentially very bad. The transition from Sanogo to a civilian administration led by Dioncounda Traore (the Speaker of Parliament) is good. Potential downsides include the facts that a)Traore is a divisive figure in Malian politics and may struggle to unite and lead the country even for a short time, b)the military may not support the transition as Sanogo does not seem to have widespread control, and c) the public supported the coup to a large degree and their reaction to civilian authority may be mixed. All in all though the transition to civilian rule is a very good thing for Mali at this point because it paves the way for international recognition of the Malian government, aid (at least humanitarian) for areas controlled by the Malian government, the reestablishment of democracy, and (most important) the lifting of sanctions imposed by ECOWAS.

The prospect of ECOWAS troops advancing into Northern Mali is not good news from my perspective for a number of reasons.

First, the rebels have said they will not advance any further south so a force intended to prevent this is unnecessary.

Second, the rebels are more divided than they appear. In my last post I mentioned the MNLA (Tuareg resistance fighters), Ansar Din (AD) (islamist fighters intent on establishing Sharia law-pictured entering the city of Timbuktu), and AQLIM (the Al Qaeda offshoot in the Sahara). Reports have indicated that there are also Arab Militia, and Militia groups forming from the tribes along the river. Two of these local groups, the Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo militias (literally 'land owners' and 'land offspring', respectively) will further destabilize the area as they are opposed to MNLA, AQLIM and AD. In the Songhai language and in this context, both names imply a low-level resistance movement against the invaders. The Malian army reportedly distributed weapons to some of these groups before it was overrun. Tuareg society is divided along clan and factional lines so the MNLA cannot be considered one cohesive force. Due to the sudden power vacuum there are also bandit groups forming to take advantage of the lack of law enforcement. The MNLA have declared Azawad to be independent and above all they now want international recognition. To gain recognition, they must prove that they are a legitimate authority and must therefore eliminate AQLIM and AD. There will very likely soon be a large amount of fighting in northern Mali: between MNLA and AQLIM/AD, most likely within the MNLA itself, and between local militias and everyone else. As far as manpower, experts consider the MNLA to be far stronger than either AD or AQLIM, but probably less organized and not as well armed. No one knows anything much about the strength of the local militias.

Given these divisions and the near certainty of further violence in Northern Mali, it would be counter intuitive for ECOWAS to send 3,000 men into the area. Why not let the rebels fight amongst themselves? The MNLA, although dangerous and universally opposed in the establishment of a new state, are not enemy #1. AQLIM and AD should be viewed as the primary enemies. Pushing soldiers north could have the very negative effects of a) uniting the rebel factions, and b) provoking Tuareg in Niger, Algeria, and Libya to join the rebellion. Particularly in Niger there is potential for a second rebellion, although the government there has handled the situation well so far.

What ECOWAS, and the international community, could do at this point is to reach out to the MNLA, as soon as it has clear leadership, in order to remove AQLIM/AD. Elimination of these two groups should be a precondition for dialogue with the MNLA. If dialogue is promised, it could provide an incentive for the MNLA to unify and eliminate AQLIM/AD without outside intervention. The situation should be monitored closely, but an invasion should not be undertaken. Bonus: Northern Mali is mostly desert and is the size of France. 3,000 men will be hard pressed to take it from veteran Tuareg warriors.

What's with Mali?

It's a question I've been asking myself for a couple weeks. In 16 days Mali has gone from a transitioning but steady democracy to a divided and virtually leaderless mess. If you haven't been following the situation, on March 21st a group of soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo (pictured) and other low-ranking officers stormed the presidential palace and state media in a successful, but not well planned, coup.This despite the fact that elections were scheduled in April. The leaders of the coup have set up a shaky military junta and have promised elections and better management of the fight against rebels in the north.

Fifteen days after the coup, Mali's new leaders have failed spectacularly at their goals. The rebels in the north took Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu (towns they've never before been able to take in three previous rebellions) giving them control of the northern half of the country. Today they declared independence and have called their new state Azawad. On the plus side, they have announced a 'unilateral ceasefire' and declared their intention not to advance farther south. The international community and regional states have issued statements against recognition of Azawad. The rebels are a combination of Tuareg (Tamajaq) nationalists in the form of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and at least two groups of radical islamists: Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) and Ansar Dine-a radical group new to Mali led by al-Din Ag Ghaly. The islamists (mujahideen) are not in favor of Azawad. Their goal is to spread Sharia law and radical theology throughout Mali.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), determined to take a hard line against the coup leaders, placed heavy sanctions on Mali early this week. The regional body also put a 2,000-man force on standby either to restore the former President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) to power or possibly to counter the rebel gains. No one is sure where, exactly, ATT is. Reports immediately after the coup put him outside Bamako, the capitol, with a company of elite but loyal 'Red Berets.'

From a humanitarian perspective, the situation is also terrible. Aid agencies have pulled all personnel from northern Mali despite a serious and worsening hunger crisis. (The hunger situation existed before the coup and rebel takeover.) April through August is traditionally 'hunger season' in the Sahel. The rains will come but until the harvest in August there will be less and less food. This is compounded by a poorer than usual harvest last August.

So that's what's happening. What next? For now, everyone (international community, ECOWAS, rebels, military junta) seem to be reacting to the new developments and thousands of refugees are fleeing northern Mali for points south and east.  

Abdoulaye Wade's Legacy

On Monday, Macky Sall was sworn in as Senegal's President, the country's fourth since independence from France in 1960. Sall's election - and former president Abdoulaye Wade's withdrawal - brought a surprisingly good ending to a steadily worsening political drama.
Abdoulaye Wade (pictured) was elected in 2000 by a large margin. A former opposition leader, he was extremely popular among the youth. More than a decade later, Wade was accused of corruption, massive but incomplete building projects, and grooming his son as heir to the presidency.

In 2011, Wade announced his intention to change the constitution to allow for a 3rd term as president (claiming his first term didn't count as part of the constitutional two-term limit) and attempted to change the cut-off for a first round winner from 50% to 25%. The presidential race in Senegal, as in many countries, is composed of two rounds. The first round eliminates all but the top two candidates unless someone has more than 50% of votes. In the second round the remaining two candidates battle for a simple majority. Wade's attempt to change the first-round percentage was countered by violent street protests after which he scrapped the plan. 

Throughout 2011 Senegal's political atmosphere continued to worsen.  Youssou N'Dour, an internationally recognized Senegalese rapper and a favorite candidate, was banned from contesting the presidential race. Worsening street protests resulted in 6 deaths after the Supreme Court ruled that Wade could in fact run for a third term.

President Wade did win the first round of the election, but with 34% he failed to reach the 50% outright-victory mark. Notably he also failed to win his home district in a suburb of Dakar, the capital. Given the authoritarian rhetoric and decisions made in the year leading up to the election, Wade should be given credit for allowing a free and fair first round. All of the eliminated opposition candidates threw their support behind Sall in the second round, ultimately giving him a complete victory with over 65% of the vote. 

Wade has not been very popular in Senegal for the last few years, and he has made some questionable decisions. History should view him differently though. He didn't attempt the use of force to hold on to power, he allowed transparent elections in both the first and second rounds, and he stepped down immediately after losing. (Bonus: he called Sall to personally congratulate him on winning the election.) These are not typical actions for a leader who confidently predicted his own victory and attempted to change the constitution to hold on to power. If Wade is lauded for these actions and not condemned for his mistakes, who knows, other elected officials in both Senegal and other countries may decide to stick to their term limits. Whatever his legacy, Wade has certainly left his mark on Senegal.

Africa is changing politically, economically, and technologically. Recent events are indicative that Africa is growing and as with all growth there are challenges, setbacks and great strides forward. In this blog, I plan to simply follow and analyze current events on the massive and diverse continent that is Africa. I do not claim to know everything, so comments, questions, and criticisms are welcome. A bit about myself: I was born in Niamey, Niger and spent most of my first 20 years in Niger. I have traveled throughout West Africa and understand the cultures, languages, and customs of some of the people of Niger. While I can claim to know one small people group, I understand that Africa is much bigger than one people and much larger than one country...